LLM Seminar Paper
Law of the Sea
3 June 1997
Rex Sinnott
I INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of the High Seas is not an absolute concept, and
although now entrenched in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)(2) has not always been the guiding
philosophy of nations with an interest in matters maritime.
Following a brief historical survey of the law pertaining to the
open sea, this paper outlines the current rights and obligations
of states and ships and highlights some of the major issues
arising from the Articles of the Convention. A conclusion then
drawn is that the current law applying to the high seas lays the
foundation for a comprehensive legal regime, which while being
reasonably sound, remains just a foundation.
II HISTORICAL SETTING
In ancient times, there were no restrictions on sailing the open
seas, and this situation continued until well into the middle
ages.(3) Venice, Genoa, Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain claimed
sovereignty over parts of the sea; and Portugal and Spain,
taking their authority from Papal Bulls of 1493, claimed
sovereignty over vast bodies of water.(4) In 1580 Elizabeth I
answered a Spanish complaint about Drake's voyage by affirming
the freedom of the seas, but after 1609 Stuart politics extended
the "closed sea" principle from Scotland to England and Ireland.(5)
After the 17th century, there was a major shift from policies
favouring mare clausum (closed sea) to those espousing freedom
of navigation, as favoured by the Dutch. Grotius in his seminal
work Mare Liberum (6) proposed that every nation was free to travel
to every other nation, and to trade with it; this view survived
strong initial opposition to eventually turn the tide against
the restrictive policies favoured by Selden in Mare Clausum.(7) By
the late 18th century the cannon-shot rule prevailed, and a
symbolic end to the claims to maritime sovereignty over the seas
came in 1805 when the British quietly dropped the "flag
ceremony",(8) to become instead an advocate for freedom of the
seas. In the 19th century the principle of freedom of the seas
continued to gain support, especially from Britain, France and
the U.S.A. on the basis of their interests in commerce and naval
power.
III THE LAW RELATING TO THE HIGH SEAS
A Background
The rules regulating the conduct of ships on the high seas have
long been regulated by customary international law, supplemented
by bilateral and multilateral treaties, and conventions relating
to specific issues. The preamble to the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas, the first attempt at establishing a comprehensive
legal regime, recognised that the provisions adopted were
generally declaratory of established principles of international
law;(9) UNCLOS in 1982 mainly follows the 1958 Convention in
relation to the high seas, with necessary adaptations to suit
changed circumstances and new elements (such as Exclusive
Economic Zones) in the law of the sea. However, the freedom of
the high seas is subject both to the Convention and to other
rules of international law.(10)
B UNCLOS 1982
Prior to UNCLOS, the high seas covered approximately 70% of the Earth's surface. The implementation of Exclusive Economic Zones shrank the high seas coverage to around 42%,(11) still by far the largest surface area covered by a uniform legal regime.(12)
The High Seas provisions to be considered here are in Part VII,
Section 1 (General Provisions), Articles 86 - 115.(13)
1 General provisions (Articles 86-89)
Article 86, in contrast to the 1958 Convention,(14) does not define
the term "high seas". Instead, it declares where the provisions
of this Part apply, rather than the status of the high seas, by
listing those bodies of water where it does not. Significantly,
this Article links to Article 58 (Exclusive Economic Zone) which
incorporates the provisions of Part VII (sections 88-115) so far
as they are compatible with EEZ rules. This is a clear
indication that the high seas and the area now incorporated in
the EEZs continue many basic rules associated with the
traditional freedom of the seas.
Article 87, as in the 1958 Convention (Article 2), declares that
the high seas are open to all States, the freedoms comprising
inter alia the freedom of navigation; of overflight; to lay
submarine cables and pipelines,(15) and of fishing.(16) New are the
freedoms to construct artificial islands(17) and to scientific
research.(18) These rights carry corresponding obligations to
respect the rights of other States - a theme which pervades not
only this Part but the entire Convention.
Article 88 reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes, and
Article 89 expressly invalidates any State claims to sovereignty
over the high seas.
2 Rights and obligations (Articles 90 - 98)
The basic right of States to sail ships flying their flag(19) is
accompanied by the right (but not an obligation) of the flag
state to exercise penal or disciplinary responsibility. Where
collisions or incidents of navigation are involved, this
authority is shared with the State of which the person involved
is a national.(20) However when an incident results in loss of life
or serious injury to a foreign national, or serious damage to
ships or installations of another State or to the marine
environment, an investigation is mandatory. Co-operation in the
inquiry with any other State involved is required.(21)
These rights are accompanied by duties to fix conditions for
registration of ships, subject to a genuine link existing
between State and ship.(22) In addition, States must exercise
control in administrative, technical and social matters
concerning ships flying its flag, including maintaining a
register of ships and ensuring safety at sea in conformance with
generally accepted international standards.
There is a duty on all ships to fly only one flag,(23) and to
render assistance to persons or ships in distress without
endangering itself or its crew or passengers.(24) A right of
immunity from the jurisdiction of States other than the flag
State is granted only to warships(25) and ships on government non-commercial service.(26)
3 Dealing with prohibited activities (Articles 99-111)
The traditional obligation on States to prohibit the
transportation of slaves is retained(27) but as with the new duty
to co-operate with other States in the suppression of the
illicit drug trade,(28) State jurisdiction remains restricted to
its own ships. In contrast, concomitant with the duty to
suppress piracy(29) and the right of hot pursuit by a coastal State
from its own waters(30) are rights of jurisdiction over the pirates
and their ship, or the foreign ship suspected of a violation of
the law, as the case may be.
A further duty, of lesser significance now than when the
Convention was promulgated, is for States to co-operate in
suppression of unauthorised broadcasting from the high seas.(31)
The "right of visit"(32) justifies a warship (or military aircraft,
or an authorised and marked government ship or aircraft) in
boarding a ship (not being a ship entitled to immunity) on the
high seas in specified circumstances. There must be reasonable
grounds to suspect involvement in piracy, the slave trade, or
unauthorised broadcasting;(33) or that the ship is without
nationality, or contrary to appearances (flying a foreign flag
or refusing to show its flag) is of the same nationality as the
warship. In the event of slaves being discovered, there is no
authority granted for the warship to take action;(34) presumably
this can be authorised by the flag State of the ship.
4 Submarine cables and pipelines (35)
All States have the right to lay cables on the bed of the high
seas beyond the continental shelf;(36) there is a corresponding
duty to adopt laws in relation to both damage caused by ships or
persons within the State's jurisdiction,(37) and to indemnity by
owners of cables to those who suffer loss in avoiding damage to
the cable.(38)
IV SOME ISSUES ARISING FROM UNCLOS 1982
A Sovereignty
Does the declaration of a "prohibited area" on the high seas
mean subjecting it to jurisdiction and sovereignty? The
commentary by the International Law Commission in 1956 said that
"no State may subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty; hence no State may exercise jurisdiction over any
such stretch of water.."(39)
As McDougal and Burke(40) note, this is a non sequitur, and does
not provide the answer.
In 1973 France, while conducting atmospheric nuclear tests,
declared a 72-mile security zone around Mururoa and interfered
with foreign ships (but not naval vessels) outside the
territorial sea.(41) Naval manoeuvres can also cause some
restrictions on movement of uninvolved ships on the high seas
near the exercises. In both cases the claim of jurisdiction is
temporary, compared to sovereignty which connotes permanent
authority. If Article 89 is compared to Article 137, which
prevents States claiming either sovereignty or sovereign rights
in the Area, it is arguable that the omission of a similar
prohibition on a claim to sovereign rights in relation to the
high seas does legitimise some unilaterally declared temporary
restrictions.
B Nationality
The question of a "genuine link" when registering ships arose
after Kuwait was allowed to register ships under the U.S.A. flag
in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq war, to gain US Navy protection. In
the leading case Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v
Netherlands Steam Navigation Co. (42) two English ships, both
flying the Dutch flag, collided at sea. The court stated that it
was "absurd.. to suppose that the mere fact of carrying a Dutch
flag makes her a Dutch ship.. The nationality of a ship depends
on her ownership and on that alone."(43) This decision treats the
ship as a chattel, which then attracts State protection similar
to that given to personal property. It also implies that
ownership without registration may nevertheless give
protection.(44) A conclusion to be drawn is that neither
registration lacking a genuine link(45) nor the flag flown (widely
recognised as a mere symbol)(46) necessarily give a ship
"nationality" as laid down in Article 91.
C Piracy
Under customary international law, universal jurisdiction was
exercisable over piracy - considered as "an act of violence
committed by a private vessel on the open sea against another
vessel with the intent to plunder (animo furandi)".(47) Pirates
were considered hostis humani generis - enemies of the human
race. In the landmark English decision In re Piracy Jure Gentium
(48) the Court endorsed a definition of piracy as "any armed
violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war".(49) The 1958
High Seas Convention and UNCLOS have very similar requirements
that the act be "for private ends", an undefined term. Political
insurgents are a recognised exception(50) but terrorists are not,
on the grounds that terrorists are a threat to all States, and
no State is willing to be held responsible for their acts.(51)
In 1961 the Santa Maria, a Portuguese cruise ship, was seized by
a political opponent of the government.(52) Although an assurance
that the hijacker would be treated as an insurgent was given by
the arresting USA destroyer, after surrender the USA said that
it had "acted under international laws against piracy".(53) Piracy
was indicated by an attack on civilian lives and property during
the seizure, but contrary views held that the lack of a takeover
by another ship, or the lack of third party involvement together
with clear indications after the seizure that public not private
ends were at stake, were a contraindication.(54) Analysis of this
situation in terms of UNCLOS turns on the meaning of "private
ends" and whether Article 101(a)(ii) extends the customary 2-ship rule to an internal takeover of a ship.
In 1975 the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez was seized by a
Cambodian patrol boat in the Gulf of Siam, more than 60 miles
off the Cambodian coast; the US government considered this as
piracy, as it did not recognise the Khymer Rouge regime, and so
did not accept the Cambodian ship as a warship.
D Mutiny
Is it piracy? There is no prohibition on mutiny as such, unless
dealt with by municipal statutes, but the construction of
Article 101(a)(ii) (a definition of piracy) does not exclude
internal seizures. It can be argued that mutiny should be
included within the ambit of piracy, on the grounds that a
hazard to navigation by all ships has been created; otherwise
the outcome of a mutiny is uncertain, as it depends on which
nation obtains jurisdiction, and how that State defines piracy.(55)
Deterring mutineers from committing acts "for private ends" may
justify this limited restriction on the sovereignty of the flag
State.(56)
E Drugs
In United States v Martinez-Hidalgo (57) a U.S Coast Guard vessel on patrol in international waters boarded an unmarked, flagless ship, after obtaining a statement of consent from Colombia, the claimed nationality of the crew and the ship. Cocaine was found on board. Following conviction in a U.S. court, the Court of Appeal for the 3rd Circuit rejected the contention that a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the U.S.A. was necessary - in spite of evidence on board ship indicating a nexus.(58) This decision conflicted with United States v Davis, a 9th Circuit Court of Appeal decision, based on the same municipal statute, the MDLEA.(59) The 3rd Circuit court stated that "Congress may override international law by clearly expressing its intention to do so".(60) The reasoning of the Court would, taken to its logical conclusion, lead to Congressional legislation supplanting current international law, and itself becoming the new international law.(61) The U.S.A. is not a signatory to UNCLOS; its legislative and judicial actions should be analysed in terms of the 1958 Convention (which has no provisions on narcotic drugs) and customary law. The provisions of UNCLOS may now be considered as having created customary international law by general acceptance; even so, the absence of an equivalent to Article 105 (giving jurisdiction over pirates) leaves the stance of the U.S.A. with no basis in international law.
While drug trafficking is widely condemned, it is not a crime
for which the universality principle provides jurisdiction for
all nations. The MDLEA (U.S.A.) is "an aggressive assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to reach illegal
narcotics trafficking on the high seas"(62) by preventing the
consideration of violations of international law in US courts,
and is consistent with the U.S.A's self-imposed role as the
worlds' policeman.
F Hot Pursuit
Hot Pursuit is an exception to the general rule that a ship on
the high seas is subject to the jurisdiction of the flag state
alone, but there is little state practice or relevant case law.
The offence justifying the pursuit must relate to where the
pursuit starts - in the EEZ, only an offence relating to the EEZ
qualifies.
It is justified as being necessary for the efficient
administration of the territorial jurisdiction of coastal
states.(63) Although there must be good reason, not mere suspicion,
to undertake pursuit, the law violated could have been trivial.
The boundaries of this right are uncertain. There is a
suggestion that a warship may be pursued, but only in self-defence.(64) A possible exception to the duty to break off pursuit
if the target ship enters the territorial sea of another State
has been suggested, if that State is unable to take up the
pursuit.(65) Resumption of a discontinued pursuit is not permitted;
but can a warship which spots an escapee from a previous pursuit
start a fresh pursuit? This may be possible on the grounds that
a second offence has been committed - attempting to evade
arrest.(66) The suggestion that a disputed resumption may be
resolved on special circumstances of each case(67) is unlikely to
engender confidence in either the pursuer or the pursued.
V CONCLUSION
UNCLOS 1982 builds on and consolidates the 1958 High Seas
Convention. The provisions are couched in general terms, which
can be seen as both a strength by meshing with existing treaties
and conventions, and as a weakness in the ongoing reliance on
customary international law and judicial decisions to "fill in
the gaps". Unless (or until) the U.S.A. becomes a signatory,
the jurisprudence and academic writings from the world's most
powerful nation will continue to treat UNCLOS as, at best,
customary international law. On the high seas, the potential for
conflict between States, and undermining of UNCLOS, exists
particularly in the exceptions to exclusive flag State
jurisdiction, where the willingness of the U.S.A. to impose its
own views is not in doubt.
The law of the sea, like all international law, serves only the
function of protecting common interest against the dissentient
powerful and lawless. Its only ultimate sanction, in a decentralised
world, is in the mutual restraint and tolerance which inhere in a
recognition of common interest. (68)
Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (4 ed,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1990).
Nicholas Grief Public International Law in the Airspace of the
High Seas (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994.
Malvina Halberstam "Terrorism on the High Seas: Achille Lauro"
(1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 269.
A. T. Johns Freedoms of the High Seas and Nuclear Testing (LLM
Research Paper, VUW, 1975).
H. Lauterpacht (ed) Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I Peace
(8 ed, Longmans, London, 1963).
Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke The Public Order of the
Oceans: a Contemporary International Law of the Sea (Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1987).
Tod A. Phillips "Exchanging Excuses for Uses of Force - The Tug
of War in the Persian Gulf" (1988) 10 Houston Journal of
International Law 275.
Nicholas M. Poulantz The Right of Hot Pursuit in International
Law (A.W. Sitjhoff, Leyden, The Netherlands, 1969).
Robert C. Reuland "The Customary Right of Hot Pursuit Onto the
High Seas: Annotations to Article 111 of the Law of the Sea
Convention" (1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 557.
James Brown Scott (ed) The Freedom of the Seas: or the Right
which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East India Trade:
dissertation by Hugo Grotius (Oxford University Press, New York,
1916).
George P. Smith, II "From Cutlass to Cat-O'-Nine Tails: The Case
for International Jurisdiction of Mutiny on the High Seas"
(1989) 10 Michigan Journal of International Law 277.
Jeffrey D. Stieb "Survey of United States Jurisdiction Over High
Seas Narcotic Trafficking" (1989) 19 Georgia Journal of
International Comparative Law 119.
Lawrence E. Stuart "The Third Circuit Sinks Due Process Limits
on the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: United States v
Martinez-Hidalgo" (1994) 18 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 401.
Sovereignty:
Can there be a limited or temporary State jurisdiction
over a part of the high seas which is compatible with
Article 89?
Nationality:
As nationality depends on a "genuine link" between State and ship, does this mean that flying the flag is not always conclusive proof of a ship's nationality?
What is the effect of flying no flag? Does such a ship
come under the jurisdiction of the State whose
nationals own the ship?
Duty to render assistance:
Do the "mutual regional arrangements" in Article 98
create an obligation on land-locked states?
Piracy:
What is the purpose of Article 101(a)(ii)? What other
places outside State jurisdiction might be anticipated
- and does the definition cover mutiny?
Drugs:
Should trafficking in drugs invoke universal
jurisdiction in the same way as piracy?
Right of Visit (Article 110)
What can the visiting warship do if slavery is
discovered; or if the ship is without nationality but
otherwise innocent?
Submarine Cables
Does the application of Part VII extend to the Area, at least as regards submarine cables and installations; or does Article 134(2) totally exclude High Seas rules within the Area?
Introduction
Historical Background
UNCLOS 1982
General Provisions: Articles 86-89
Rights and Obligations: Articles 90-98
Prohibited Activities: Articles 99-111
Cables and Pipelines: Articles 112-115
Conclusion
State Claim of Sovereignty
Venice Adriatic Sea
Genoa Ligurian Sea
Sweden, Denmark Baltic Sea
Great Britain Narrow Seas, North Sea, The
Atlantic from North Cape to
Cape Finisterre.
Portugal Indian Ocean
The Atlantic south of Morocco
Spain The Pacific
Gulf of Mexico
(source: Oppenheim's International Law (8 ed)
Other States claiming sovereignty: Tuscany, The
Papacy, Turkey
Source: Principles of Public International Law (Brownlie)
Conventions: Salvage; Assistance; Collision; Safety
at Sea.
1. A Maritime State must lay down rules for vessels
flying its flag, and furnish official
authorisation to the ship.
2. A State has the right to punish vessels flying
its flag without authorisation.
3. Vessels and their persons and goods on the high
seas are under the jurisdiction of the flag
State.
4. Every State can punish piracy on the high seas,
including piracy by foreigners; and warships can
require all suspect ships to show their flag.
[Right of Pursuit onto the high seas]
Supplemented by municipal laws on:
1. Conditions for authorisation to fly the flag
2. Details of jurisdiction over persons and goods
3. Discipline on board
4. Punishment for sailing under the flag without
authorisation
Oppenheim p. 590-591.
Article 86 Application
87 Freedom of the High Seas
88 Peaceful Purposes
89 Sovereignty Claims
Article 90 Right of Navigation
91 Nationality
92 Ships to sail under one flag only
93 U.N. ships
94 Duties of the flag State
95 Immunity of warships
96 Immunity of government ships
97 Penal Jurisdiction
98 Duty to Render Assistance
99 Slavery
100-107 Piracy
108 Illicit Drugs
109 Unauthorised Broadcasting
110 Right of Visit
111 Hot Pursuit
112-115 Submarine Cables and Pipelines
1. James Brown Scott (ed) The Freedom of the Seas: or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East India Trade: dissertation by Hugo Grotius (Oxford University Press, New York, 1916), 7: by the Law of Nations navigation is free to all persons whatever.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, reprinted 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
3. H. Lauterpacht (ed) Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I Peace (4 ed, Longmans, London, 1963), 583.
4. Above n 3: Portugal - the whole of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic south of Morocco; Spain - the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico.
5. Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (4 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990), 233.
6. The full title of this dissertation (chapter 12 of De jure praedae by Grotius) is Mare liberum seu de jure quod Batavis competit ad indiciana commercia dissertatio: see above n 1.
7. Mare Clausum sive de Dominio Maris: written in 1618, printed in 1635 by command of King Charles I, with an English translation in 1652.
8. This was a requirement that foreign vessels salute the British flag within seas over which the British claimed sovereignty.
9. "Convention on the High Seas. Done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958" reprinted in S.H. Lay, R. Churchill, M. Nordquist (eds) New Directions in the Law of the Sea I Documents (Oceana Publications, New York, 1973), 23.
10. Article 87.
11. Data deduced from Nicholas Grief Public International Law in the Airspace of the High Seas (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994).
12. The Area is of course approximately the same size, though the law applying to it is largely new and untested.
13. Section 2, Conservation and Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas, is beyond the scope of this paper.
14. Article 1: The term "high seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.
15. Subject to Part VI.
16. Subject to Section 2.
17. Subject to Part VI.
18. Subject to Parts VI and XIII.
19. Article 90.
20. Article 97.
21. Article 94.
22. Article 92.
23. Using two or more for convenience results in being treated as a ship with no nationality - Article 92.
24. Article 98.
25. Article 95.
26. Article 96.
27. 1958 High Seas Convention, Article 13.
28. Article 108.
29. See Articles 100-107.
30. EEZ, contiguous zone, territorial sea or internal sea.
31. Article 109.
32. Article 110.
33. Provided the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under Article 109.
34. See Article 99.
35. Considered hereafter together as cables.
36. Article 112.
37. Articles 113, 114.
38. Article 115.
39. 1956 Report, 24; quoted in Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke The Public Order of the Oceans: a Contemporary International Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1987), 82.
40. See above n 39.
41. A. T. Johns Freedoms of the High Seas and Nuclear Testing (LLM Research Paper, VUW, 1975), 1.
42. (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 512.
43. Above n 42, 535-536.
44. Tod A. Phillips "Exchanging Excuses for Uses of Force - The Tug of War in the Persian Gulf" (1988) 10 Hous.J.Int'l.L 275, 282.
45. Above n 44, 280.
46. Above n 44, 281.
47. Above n 3, 608.
48. 1934 AC 586.
49. Above n 48, 598.
50. Malvina Halberstam "Terrorism on the High Seas: Achille Lauro" (1988) 82 A.J.I.L. 269, 274-276.
51. Above n 50, 289.
52. This event was considered under customary law, as the 1958 Convention on the High Seas did not come into effect until 30 September, 1962.
53. Above n 50, 286.
54. Above n 50, 287.
55. George P. Smith, II "From Cutlass to Cat-O'-Nine Tails: The Case for International Jurisdiction of Mutiny on the High Seas" (1989) 10 Mich.J.Int'l.L. 277, 295.
56. Above n 55, 301.
57. 993 F.2d 1052 3d Cir. 1993, cert denied, 114 S. Ct 699 (1994).
58. For instance: indications that the U.S.A. was the destination of the ship.
59. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 46 U.S.C. app. ss 1901-1903 (1988).
60. Above n 57, 1056.
61. Lawrence E. Stuart "The Third Circuit Sinks Due Process Limits on the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: United States v Martinez-Hidalgo" (1994) 18 Tul.Mar.L.J. 401, 413-414.
62. Jeffrey D. Stieb "Survey of United States Jurisdiction Over High Seas Narcotic Trafficking" (1989) 19 Georgia.J.Int.Comp.L. 119, 122.
63. Robert C. Reuland "The Customary Right of Hot Pursuit Onto the High Seas: Annotations to Article 111 of the Law of the Sea Convention" (1993) 33 Virg.J.I.L. 557, 559.
64. Nicholas M. Poulantz The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (A.W. Sitjhoff, Leyden, The Netherlands, 1969) 187, 192.
65. Above n 63, 577.
66. Above n 63, 571.
67. Above n 63, 581.
68. McDougal & Burke, see above n 39, 88.