WILLIAM LYTLE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR – part 1

Emigrating to New York City from County Mayo, Ireland, William Lytle was

living at Goshen (Orange Co.), New York by May of 1775, when he signed the

Articles of Association, confirming that he supported the American Colonies

in their struggle against England. Since he was a linen weaver and had a

trade, he most likely was hurt by the stiff taxes that Great Britain

continued to impose upon the Colonists. Most landowners, merchants,

craftsmen, and tradesmen were affected financially by these taxes, and

these were the men who pushed the War for Independence most vigorously,

even though it was the common man who actually fought the battles. William

had a trade and was most likely considered middle class because of that, so

he may have had financial motives to sign the Articles and to take part in

the war.

He enlisted in the New York Militia for 6 months from Goshen on June 21,

1775. He was mustered into Captain David Denton’s Company, under Major

Dubois, in Colonel Wyncoop’s Second New York Regiment. A month later, on

July 22, his militia unit was incorporated into the Third Regiment of the

New York Line of the Continental Army (which had been created in June of

1775 by the new Continental Congress) under Colonel James Clinton and

General Philip J. Schuyler.

As the patriot leaders began to plan their resistance against England,

they looked hopefully at Canada for a "fourteenth colony" to join them,

even though they had received no encouragement from the citizens. Quebec

was peopled by Roman Catholic Frenchmen rather than Protestants of English

descent, and no common cause was found. The Americans needed whatever help

they could get from the inhabitants of Quebec, and they hoped to secure

significant aid from the French Canadians, traditionally unhappy under

British rule. As long as England held Canada, the armies could advance

southward at any time following the waterway from the St. Lawrence Seaway

to Lake Champlain, Lake George, and the Hudson River; this was the classic

invasion route, and it ran, with one 20-mile portage, from Montreal all the

way to New York City. So the military strategists in the American Colonies

were more than eager to seize Quebec from the British Empire early in the

war.

The capture of Fort Ticonderoga on the southern end of Lake Champlain by

Benedict Arnold’s Connecticut militia and Ethan Allen’s Vermont Green

Mountain Boys on May 10, 1775, opened the way for an American advance into

Canada. Important for the cause, supplies captured at Ticonderoga included

at least 78 serviceable guns, 6 mortars, three howitzers, thousands of

cannon balls, 30,000 flints, and other stores. The Americans also

proceeded to plunder British private property in the area, adding to the

supplies needed by an invading army which was, until that time, badly

undersupplied. But the take was somewhat diminished when many members of

the Connecticut and Vermont militia suddenly deserted with their booty and

returned home.

The Continental Congress resolved on June 1 that the proposed operation

against Canada should not be undertaken, as many of its members were as yet

reluctant to commit the nation to a war for outright independence.

Meanwhile, while the American political and military leaders wasted

critical time arguing about the venture, British General Sir Guy Carleton,

the governor-general of Quebec, worked vigorously and effectively to scrape

troops together, having at the beginning of the campaign only 450 regular

soldiers at his disposal. Urged by his superiors to recruit the Indians,

Carleton’s contempt of them as soldiers and his disgust of their atrocities

during warfare kept him from enlisting more than a few of them. But he

continued to try to build up his forces as Congress continued to squander

away valuable time. Finally, on June 27, Congress reversed its position

and directed New York General Philip Schuyler to invade Quebec "if

practicable, and if not disagreeable" to the French Canadians.

General Schuyler was a wealthy, comfortable, and snobbish country

gentleman who was much too cautious and agonizingly patient, and his health

was poor, so his preparations for the campaign were maddeningly slow. In

August of 1775, he ordered 3,000 New England and New York troops (William

Lytle included) to rendezvous at Ticonderoga in order to organize and

prepare to launch the invasion of Canada from there. The strategy was to

be a two-pronged push----Benedict Arnold’s 1,100 troops, furnished with

rations for 45 days, were to push up through the wilderness of Maine to

strike at the heavily-fortified city of Quebec from the south, while

General Richard Montgomery (Schuyler’s second in command, a former British

officer who had joined the American side) was to simultaneously push up

Lake Champlain into Canada and strike from the west after taking Fort St.

Johns. William Lytle was with Montgomery’s New York contingent, as was

Aaron Burr, then only 19 years of age and, at that time, relatively

unknown.

Predictably, General Schuyler lingered at Ticonderoga for many weeks,

gathering more men and supplies, building boats to cross Lake Champlain,

and gathering information about Canada. Besides being in ill health,

Schuyler was not the kind of man who would go forward without overly

careful and painstaking preparation. Although he had many obstacles before

him to overcome, he made far too much of his troubles. He did not seem to

realize that his delay was giving General Carleton time to prepare his

defense of Canada. Plus, it was highly desirable that the patriots achieve

their objective before the onset of the harsh Canadian winter, and his

snail’s pace of movement was doing nothing to ensure that.

As late as August 8, the force Schuyler had with him at Ticonderoga did

not exceed 1,200 men, and the supply of gunpowder was insufficient. And

worse, the old general soon discovered that the strength of the army he was

slowly gathering was only in its numbers. There was no sense of discipline

among the green new recruits and volunteers, and no respect for their

officers. Instead, there was an almost defiant independence of thought,

judgement, and action in his men, with no time for proper training or

instruction.

The first objective of Schuyler’s thrust into Canada was Fort St. Johns

(now called St. Jean). Twenty miles southeast of Montreal and near the

head of navigation from Lake Champlain down the Richelieu (or Sorel) River

to the St. Lawrence River and Seaway, the fort occupied a strategic

position along the invasion route, last used during the French and Indian

Wars. It was defended by 200 regular troops, several cannon, a small

Indian contingent, with Major Charles Preston in command. The British were

rapidly building two 12-gun vessels to assist in defending the fort from

the river or the lake.

On August 17, General Montgomery arrived at Ticonderoga. On that same

day, Schuyler left Montgomery in temporary command at Lake Champlain and

went to Albany, New York, for a meeting with Indian leaders who were being

recruited as potential allies to accompany them on the campaign. Learning

that the construction of the two new ships at St. Johns was nearing

completion and thereby threatening to seize control of Lake Champlain,

Montgomery decided to move against the threat without waiting for

Schuyler’s approval, especially since he had concluded that his commanding

officer’s delays had already been far too costly for the campaign. On

August 28, 1775, Montgomery started north on Lake Champlain toward Ile aux

Noix, a low, flat, brush-covered island dotted with insect-infested swamps

in the Richelieu River, twenty miles south of St. Johns; here he intended

to set up defenses that would block the passage of the two

newly-constructed ships into the lake. His command of about 1,200 men

(including William Lytle) advanced in a small fleet of two sailing vessels,

gondolas, bateaux, rowing galleys, pirougues, and canoes, but his progress

was slowed by storms and he did not reach the island until September 3.
 
 

General Schuyler, his health continuing to deteriorate, pushed forward

with supplies from Ticonderoga and joined Montgomery on September 5, and,

surprisingly, approved his subordinate officer’s aggressive actions.

Although the expected French Canadian allies did not appear to reinforce

them, Schuyler nevertheless stripped his men of baggage and pushed toward

St. Johns in the boats. Landing a mile and a half away, the Americans were

advancing through the swamps to attack when a flank patrol was ambushed by

100 Indians under the command of a New York Tory. The inexperienced

Colonial troops were nearly routed as a skirmish developed in the

underbrush, but the Indians were driven off. The patriots lost 16 men in

the fight and did not pursue the retreating enemy. That was William

Lytle’s first taste of combat, and it was not to be his last.

Returning to Ile aux Noix, Schuyler decided to erect defenses against the

British, convinced that they would attack, and this wasted more valuable

time. He was soon reinforced to 1,700 men, including some Indians who had

been rejected earlier by Carleton (ironically, this was more than twice the

strength of all of the British regulars in Canada). Although advised by

his officers that the fort was too strongly held for him to capture, the

ailing old general organized a second attack on the night of September 10.
 
 

Colonel Rudophus Ritzema’s New York troops, which most likely included

William Lytle, landed and started through the heavy woods with the goal of

attacking St. Johns from the north. Colliding in the dark with part of

Montgomery’s covering force, which had moved into position near the camp

abandoned on September 6, the skittish New Yorkers thought they were being

ambushed. Most of them stampeded back to the boats, but Montgomery rallied

some of them and sent them forward again. A second panic occurred when a

few rounds of British artillery shook the trees around them, but Ritzema

managed to hold together some 50 militiamen and continue the advance toward

the fort. They were halted by musket fire from a small house and, though

reinforcements came forward to support them, Ritzema (who later in the war

would defect to the British because he was passed over for a promotion that

he thought he deserved) stopped the action around 3 a.m. and withdrew to

the beachhead. Another advance had been planned for the next morning, but

the troops were alarmed by a report that one of the new ships was near

their boats and refused to go into action.

Back on Ile aux Noix, General Montgomery assumed command of the operation

on September 16 when Schuyler’s long illness worsened and he returned to

Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Benedict Arnold’s force began its long march

through the Maine wilderness toward Quebec on September 13. Despite a sick

list of 600 (camping in the swamps, malaria and dysentery plagued the men)

and all the makings of a mutiny among his demoralized, ill-disciplined

troops, Montgomery was able to promptly resume the offensive as

reinforcements arrived. The Americans were now suffering from cold

weather, struggling to construct their lines and batteries in the marshy

ground, thinned by sickness, and short of supplies. For a while, the men

were forced to subsist on half rations, but Schuyler eventually arranged to

send food and ammunition forward from Ticonderoga. Although an effective

artillery fire could be sent into the fort, the patriots were incapable of

taking the place by assault, so Montgomery elected to starve the British

troops inside into submission.

The troops under General Montgomery were an undisciplined, untrained

group, and the officers had little or no control over them. One observer

wrote: "The men had to be coddled, their permission obtained before this or

that could be done. At one time, when Montgomery wanted to erect a battery

in a certain position, his field officers absolutely refused to do so."

Montgomery, in private letters, described his New Yorkers as "the sweepings

of the York streets." Militia would come and join his effort, and militia

would promptly leave and go home without warning, adding to the general’s

problems. But, in spite of all of these difficulties, Montgomery refused

to abandon the siege of Fort St. Johns.

The saving of General Montgomery’s Canadian campaign came with the fall of

Fort Chambly, less than ten miles to the south and a major link between

Fort St. Johns and Montreal. Although of great strategic importance, it

was not solidly built and was fortified with only 88 men, because Carleton

did not think that it could fall as long as St. Johns held out. On the

night of October 17, the Americans were able to float 9-pound guns past the

defenses of St. Johns to Chambly; after these cannon put a few rounds

through the impressive-looking but thin-walled stone fort, the walls began

to collapse, and the British quickly surrendered. Supplies from Fort

Chambly included 6 tons of gunpowder, 6,500 musket cartridges, 3 mortars,

and 125 British muskets. Large amounts of food were also taken, including

80 barrels of flour, 134 barrels of pork, and a quantity of rice, butter,

and peas. The fall of Chambly give Montgomery much-needed rations, arms,

and most valuable of all, enough gunpowder (120 barrels) to renew his

campaign.

Seeing that situation was now critical at St. Johns, General Carlton sent

800 men from Montreal to relieve Major Preston’s besieged soldiers, who

were faced with dwindling supplies and food resources. The rescue attempt

was stopped at Longueuil, a major crossing point on the St. Lawrence River

to the south opposite Montreal. On October 30, the Canadian force

attempted to cross the river and were met by Seth Warner’s Green Mountain

Boys (Warner led the Vermont men now that Ethan Allen had been captured at

Montreal and sent to imprisonment in England after an abortive independent

invasion) and a portion of the New York militia (perhaps William Lytle),

supported by a four-pounder cannon. The artillery and musket fire drove

back the main attacking force easily; later, another British detachment was

prevented from crossing farther up the river.

After having delayed the American invasion for nearly two months, and with

only three days’ supplies left and certain starvation in the future,

Preston realized that his situation was hopeless, especially since

Carleton’s rescue mission had been thwarted. On November 2, 1775, he

surrendered Fort St. Johns to General Montgomery, with his entire command

of almost 500 regulars and 100 Canadians taken prisoner. As evidence of

the unstable and peculiar state of the American troops at that time, one

regiment mutinied because Montgomery had allowed the prisoners to keep

their extra suits of clothing instead of treating everything as plunder.

Although Carleton lost almost all of his regular troops, captured at

Chambly and St. Johns, he nevertheless had forced the patriots into waging

a winter campaign, as November had suddenly arrived. But, to the

Americans’ advantage, the fall of St. Johns had left Montreal open to

capture. The advance from Ft. St. Johns, as rapid as possible because of

the onset of the cruel Canadian winter, began on November 5, and the first

of Montgomery’s men landed above Montreal on November 11.

Having no more than 150 regulars and a few militia to face Montgomery,

General Carleton sailed away with these troops and the most valuable

military supplies in a flotilla of small boats in an attempt to set up a

last stand at Quebec. Bombardment from the patriot shore batteries,

adverse winds, and some effective bluffing by the American troops led to

the surrender of most of the armed watercraft, the stores, and all

personnel except for Carleton himself and one or two of his officers. Sir

Guy managed to slip through the night in a small vessel propelled by

muffled oars; he then escaped, disguised as a French Canadian, to a point

opposite Sorel and made his way to Quebec in a whaleboat. General

Montgomery accepted the surrender of Montreal on November 13 after

receiving little or no resistance from its inhabitants.

With the fall of Montreal, the battlefield shifted to Quebec. Benedict

Arnold’s expedition, half-starved and exhausted from the long trek through

the vast wilderness of Maine, reached the St. Lawrence River opposite the

city on November 11 and would have crossed the next night if it had not

been delayed by a three-day storm. In the meantime, the defenders of the

city received some badly-needed help----170 Royal Scotch soldiers had

reached Quebec on November 2, and more reinforcements slipped in by water

on the 13th; Sir Guy Carleton had transferred from the whaleboat to an

armed schooner that was speeding him toward Quebec. Meanwhile,

Montgomery’s army was also on the way, after constructing flatboats with

which to attack the British armaments that surrounded the heavily-fortified

city.

The river froze over, and Arnold, having no artillery, waited for

Montgomery as the British were further reinforced; Carleton arrived on

November 19 to take command. His first official act was to require all

persons who refused to aid in the defense of the city to leave within four

days or be prosecuted as spies. Upon their removal, his available force

for defense consisted of at least 300 regulars, 330 Anglo-Canadian militia,

543 French Canadians, and 485 seamen and marines. He now fortified the

city with nearly 2,000 men, along with 200 heavy cannon, which, at that

time, made Quebec the strongest fortress in North America.

General Montgomery arrived through ten-foot drifts of snow two weeks

later, on December 2, and assumed command of the operation from Arnold.

But he brought with him only 450 men with combat experience, having lost

300 Connecticut soldiers who had abandoned the expedition and returned to

Ticonderoga (plus the desertion of the Green Mountain Boys), much to his

open disgust. The remainder of his forces (including William Lytle, who

had enlisted for five more months earlier in November) totaled around one

thousand, so he was now outnumbered by about two to one by the enemy he was

now preparing to besiege inside the thick walls of the fortress city. But,

to his advantage, he had artillery and a good supply of food, ammunition,

and clothing captured from the British at Chambly, St. Johns, and Montreal.

The loss in numbers, however, did not represent the true state of his

army. Officers and men alike were quarrelsome, dictatorial, and

self-willed. They claimed the inherent right to do just as they pleased,

and to obey orders only if they thought them reasonable or serving their

own interests. The aspiration for national liberty had instilled a sense

of personal liberty in many of them, and that personal freedom was thought

to extend to the military, so countless militiamen absolutely refused to

obey directives from their superiors. Another problem with which

Montgomery had to deal was the refusal of troops to serve under officers

from other colonies than their own. This lack of discipline among his

troops drove him to such distraction that, on one occasion, completely

frustrated, he offered his resignation to General George Washington, which

Washington promptly refused.

By December 5, the Americans were outside the gates of Quebec. From the

Plains of Abraham, the wide plateau over which the city looked, Montgomery

sent a message to Carleton demanding his surrender. Sir Guy replied that

he would not bargain with rebels, and Montgomery then sent a second demand,

informing the Canadian general that he could not hold out with his motley

and unreliable forces against his own troops, hardened by their trials and

stimulated by their cause; if Carleton insisted upon fighting, he went on,

then he must take the city, and he feared that he might not be able to

control his angry men. The governor did not bother to reply to him.

General Carleton felt that he had good reason to be not particularly

concerned by the American general’s threats, since he had recently

benefitted from ample time to make ready his defenses----he had collected

more men, and had food enough to last for months, and they had done what

they could to repair and strengthen the thick walls of the city and to

guard them with artillery. He figured that if he could hold out until

spring, he would certainly receive help from England, and surely more

assistance than the patriots would get; in addition, he and his men were

protected against the severe Canadian winter, while Montgomery’s army would

have to suffer from being constantly exposed to the extreme cold. For all

of these reasons, Carleton believed that Montgomery could not profitably

carry on a long siege. He was not about to be bluffed, nor would he

surrender----if the Americans wanted Quebec, they would have to take it by

force.

Although the defenders had more than twice the men he did, Montgomery

still planned to take Quebec by assault. He was reported to have said that

he would "dine in Quebec or in Hell by Christmas." His decision to attack

was reinforced by an exchange of fire between his artillery and the cannon

of Quebec. Batteries erected by Montgomery threw shots into the city and

inflicted some casualties, but the return cannon fire from behind the walls

severely damaged his batteries. It was impossible to reach the walls of

the city by slow approaches under cover of entrenchments, for the ground

was now frozen solid. Lacking siege artillery capable of penetrating the

thick stone walls, faced with the harsh Canadian winter and

soon-to-be-expiring enlistments (including William Lytle’s), his only

chance of capturing the heavily-fortified city was by assault.

The western walls, facing the Plains of Abraham, were far too strong to

storm, so the strategy called for feints in that area while Montgomery and

Arnold would converge on Quebec’s lower town from opposite sides, then push

up into the upper town; the signal for these attacks was to be a discharge

of rockets at Cape Diamond. This operation would have to be undertaken at

night, perhaps in bad weather, to permit getting close enough to the walls

for the assault to have any hope of success. Unfortunately for the

patriots, Carleton had already learned of Montgomery’s plans from an

American sergeant who had deserted and gone over to the British., so he had

organized his defenses accordingly. Benedict Arnold’s men would have to

follow a narrow, winding street, which was well defended, to reach the

center of the lower town from the north. The defenders had erected a

two-story blockhouse from which they could deliver cannon and musket fire

along the narrow avenue approach at Cape Diamond, blocking the route which

Montgomery would have to follow to reach the lower town from the south,

Because many of his soldiers’ enlistments would expire on January 1 of

1776, Montgomery knew that he would have to attack by December 31, but he

was awaiting the ideal weather conditions to determine which night would be

best for the assault. The night of December 26 was one of intense cold

even for that latitude, and his troops suffered greatly. The climate

moderated somewhat during the next two days and even became unseasonably

fair on the 29th. But signs of foul weather became apparent on December

30, as the sky clouded over during the afternoon, the wind picked up, and

flurries began. Soon after dark, a fierce snowstorm was in progress, and

it was to continue through New Year’s Eve. Since a large portion of his

men were in their final day of service, Montgomery had no choice but to

make his move on December 31.

The time had come, at last. Some of his officers attempted to argue that

the planned assault was suicidal, at best, but General Montgomery would

hear none of that. He had come all that distance, spent all that time and

all those resources, and this, tonight, would be his final chance for

success. The fate of the entire Canadian campaign now lay in this final

night of 1775, Montgomery reasoned, and there would never be a better

opportunity than the present.

Troops were ordered to their billets by midnight and told to get prepared

for the upcoming assault. They assembled at 2 a.m., and two hours later

were moving out into a raging blizzard with winds so fierce that it blew

snow, and at times, a fine sleet, horizontally into the men’s faces.

William Lytle was in General Montgomery’s column moving toward the city

from the south.

The feints fizzled out quickly without fooling Carleton in the least. One

group broke and ran, while another delivered a sustained fire against the

Cape Diamond bastion without any discernable effect. From his position on

the Plains of Abraham, Montgomery led 300 New York militiamen (including

William Lytle and the someday-to-be-famous Aaron Burr) through the howling

blizzard, down a mile of narrow, twisting, snow-choked trail, covered with

waist-high drifts, to Wolfe’s Cove. From this point, they struggled

another two miles along the St. Lawrence River’s northern bank with their

cumbersome scaling ladders (to eventually be used against the walls of

Quebec, if they ever got that far). Because of shoal ice, which the tides

had pushed up from the river into their path, they were forced at several

places to climb up onto the slate slopes on the land side to get past. The

snow and sleet blowing in their faces made it impossible for the men to

recognize each other at the distance of a few feet, and equally impossible

to communicate orders except by messengers. Men’s breathing soon covered

their faces with ice, the single trail became hard and slippery, and the

march was along a ledge where a careless step could send a man hurtling

down into the darkness to the frozen river below.

Unexpectedly, and a half an hour too early, the rocket signals put the

garrison inside the fortress on the alert. Montgomery and about fifty of

his men had just passed under Point Diamond around 5 a.m., while the bulk

of his force, with the ladders, still struggled through the snow and ice a

half a mile to the rear. He halted his advance guard within fifty yards of

a fortified position that the faint dawn revealed across their path----it

was a blockhouse, and the patriot general had no idea that the British had

installed four pieces of artillery in addition to the men with muskets

inside. The excessive roughness of the march had so lengthened his column

that he found it necessary to pause for a few minutes in order to collect a

force with which he might venture to proceed, now that he had finally

reached the lower town.

When Montgomery and a group of four officers and thirteen men rushed

forward along a narrow street against the blockhouse, the defenders, who

had wisely held their fire until the Americans were within a few paces of

them, cut loose with a barrage of grapeshot from the cannons and blazing

musket fire. A Canadian defender in the blockhouse later said: "Our

musketry and guns continued to sweep the avenue leading to our battery for

some minutes. When the smoke cleared, there was not a soul to be seen."

At least no one could be seen on his feet----but thirteen bodies lay

lifeless in the snow. General Montgomery had been killed instantly by the

point-blank fire, along with two of his officers, and nearly all of his

soldiers in the advance guard had been either slain or wounded; only Aaron

Burr and a few others had managed to escape unhurt. The slaughter of the

close-range firing seemed to have convinced the rebels that the post was

held too strongly, for they did not attack again. Colonel Donald Campbell

took command and led the remainder of the New York militiamen (William

Lytle included) to the rear in full retreat.

Meanwhile, Benedict Arnold’s command was surrounded and overwhelmed in the

narrow streets of the lower town as they futilely waited for the planned

rendezvous with Montgomery’s column that was never to come. Some men

managed to escape over the ice in the river as they attempted to retreat

from the city, but the majority of them were trapped, finally surrendering

at about 9 a.m.. Arnold himself was badly wounded in the leg by a musket

ball and carried away to safety. Outside Quebec, the wounded but still

determined Arnold managed to assemble enough men, including William Lytle,

to beat off a British attempt to rout what was left of the American army.

From his hospital bed at nearby St. Roche, Arnold instituted a new siege

of the city, planting more cannon on the Plains of Abraham and maintaining

a stiff blockade around it, defiantly daring Carleton and the winter to do

their worst. Uncertain of how many men the new American commander still

had at his disposal, General Carleton elected to settle down behind

Quebec’s thick, massive walls for the rest of the winter, while Arnold

continued his feeble attempt at a siege, withdrawing to a distance of three

miles from the town and entrenching himself as well as he could. His

operations were at that point limited to shutting the city off from

supplies. He wrote to his sister: "I have no thought of leaving this proud

town until I first enter it in triumph."

Of the 1,800 men under Carleton, only 5 were killed and 13 wounded in the

all-out assault of the Battle of Quebec. The Americans had used 800 troops

in the assault; of these, 426 were captured and another 60 were killed or

wounded. The loss of Richard Montgomery was a particularly stunning blow

to the patriots, since he was thought to be a general of exceptional

promise (although many historians consider his attack on Quebec to be

foolhardy).

With about 600 men----including some Canadians and Indians who had joined,

but soon reduced by 100 men whose time of enlistment expired----Benedict

Arnold (along with William Lytle) remained outside the walls of Quebec

through three months of frigid winter and an outburst of smallpox among his

men. But he refused to abandon his camp or his blockade of the city.

Instead, he called for fresh troops to renew the attack on Quebec. General

David Wooster was holding Montreal, Chambly, and St. Johns with fewer than

600 men, and had no troops to spare; plus, a British regiment was still in

the Great Lakes region, and the Indian threat was always present. General

Schuyler could offer him no assistance from Albany, since he was occupied

with Tory uprisings in the Mohawk River Valley. An emissary was sent by

Arnold to Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress voted on January 19

to send reinforcements to Canada. General George Washington, though busy

with the siege at Boston by the British, agreed to spare four battalions

and send them to Quebec. But supplies were quickly becoming scarce for the

troops around the city, and the long, hard winter was taking its toll on

the men.

The reinforcements and the supplies did not come until early April, and

the freezing, starving American troops were no doubt elated to see warmer

weather, some food and clothing, and more soldiers. General Wooster

assumed command on April 2 of a force that now numbered 2,000. After

looking over the enemy defenses, he exercised his artillery for a while,

but the cannon and mortars were once again ineffective against the thick

walls of the fortress city. Benedict Arnold, who had been promoted to

Brigadier General on January 10, left to take command at Montreal; his

wound had healed, but he had later re-injured the leg when his horse fell

on him (he was, later in the war, to become the most infamous traitor in

American history when he defected to the British side). Major General John

Thomas reached Quebec on May 1, and assumed command of an army that had

been built up to 2,500, only to soon be reduced by death, disease,

discharges, and desertions to 1,900; the 1,000 of these listed on the

rosters as "fit for duty" were further reduced by expiration of 300

enlistments (William Lytle’s second enlistment was to be over on May 5),

and 200 more were under quarantine from smallpox.

At this point, the ice was moving rapidly down the river during the

long-awaited spring thaw. Reinforcements were known to have left England

and Ireland, and there was no possibility of substantial American offensive

activity. Although more Colonial reinforcements were said to be on the

way, the supply of rebel gunpowder had been reduced to 150 barrels, and the

store of provisions on hand was barely enough for 6 days of rationed use.

A council of war was held, and an immediate retreat to Three Rivers,

Canada, was decided upon as the only means of saving the army from

starvation, capture, or obliteration.

But before anything could be done, there was the appearance in the St.

Lawrence River of the relieving force from England so long anticipated by

General Carleton, a formidable army of British regulars and Hessians under

General John Burgoyne. The very sight of the fleet carrying Burgoyne’s

troops created panic in the American camp. On May 2, Carleton came out

from behind the walls of Quebec at 1:00 p.m. with nearly 1,000 men and 6

pieces of artillery, making a spirited attack on the Colonial position.

The only force available to the rebels at that time was about 300 men (one

of whom was William Lytle) and one piece of artillery, so General Thomas

wisely retreated. Nearly 100 prisoners (besides the sick in the hospital),

his supplies (including nearly two tons of powder and 500 muskets), and his

artillery were captured by the enemy. The Americans were routed into a

disorderly retreat, which ended at Deschambault, about 58 miles toward

Montreal. General Thomas ordered no halts during the march, and his

soldiers spent a fearful night staggering through the woods, streams, and

swamps, with nothing to hope for but to escape from Canada. During the

last two months of the campaign, 5,000 men had died, either by disease or

in the battles. One observer wrote of the hungry, exhausted, utterly

demoralized soldiers: "Their condition could not be described in words."

It was during that long, disorganized retreat, on May 5, 1776, that

William Lytle was discharged from the militia, eventually making his way

back to Goshen, New York. He did not sign up for another enlistment----and

who could blame him, at that time? He had just spent an entire winter

freezing and hungry in camp in Canada, had fought in an entirely mismanaged

campaign, was now starving, exhausted, and on the run from the victorious

enemy, and now smallpox was once again sweeping through the men. This most

recent smallpox epidemic eventually caused General Thomas’ death on June 2.

On the night of June 18, 1776, General Benedict Arnold and a fellow

officer, having shot their horses to keep them from falling into British

hands, pushed off from the Canadian shore in a canoe----the last Americans

to abandon a lost cause.

Canada was now lost to the Americans forever. Time had beaten the

patriots----Congress had wasted weeks before authorizing the campaign,

Schuyler wasted weeks organizing it, and the British bought themselves even

more time with their long resistance at Fort St. Johns. It has been

theorized that if any of these delays had been reduced by perhaps as little

as two weeks, the end result of the campaign might have been different.

But the American would have most likely not been able to hold Quebec even

if they had taken it, because of British naval superiority and the

reinforcements that were on the way. Although the Canadian campaign is

considered to be a totally misguided series of blunders, some historians

have argued that it delayed the British invasion of New York by forcing

them to send an army to the St. Lawrence, thus dividing its forces in North

America. It also may have lured the British into a false sense of

security, leading the overconfident, arrogent General Burgoyne into a

military disaster at Saratoga, New York, as he moved down the Hudson River

from Canada----and, most importantly, the rebel victory at Saratoga led to

the signing of the French-American alliance that ultimately assured

American independence.

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