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Lawrence Roscoe Hinkle went by Roscoe born August 9, 1896 in Whitley County,Kentucky to Peter "Pete" Hinkle & Margaret Elizabeth "Peg" Jones Hinkle. Grandson of Pvt. James Madison Hinkle & Delia "Dilly" Davis Hinkle & Stepmother Mary "Polly"Taylor Hinkle & Great Grandson of William Hinkle & Susannah Treadway & GG Grandson of Michael "Micha" Jr. & Nancy "Haggins" Hinkle & GGG Grandson of Michael "Micha" Sr. & Rebecca "Spurgin" Hinkle & GGGG Grandson of Anthony Jacob II & Anna Margaret "Unknown, GROFF" Her 2nd marriage after the death of Anthony Jacob II Hinkle & GGGGG Grandson of Rev. Anthony Jacob & Maria Elizabeth "Dentzer" Henckel/Hinkle.
Roscoe married Julie Maiden on October 8, 1915 in Pulaski County, Kentucky, born October 6, 1900, died August 12, 1986. After Roscoe's death Julie married 5 years later to Patrick Kelley on April 17,1948 in Pulaski County,Kentucky, Patrick died 1961 in Pulaski County,Kentucky. The Court Appeal Document below explains the death of Roscoe. Lawrence Roscoe Hinkle was a Baptist minister and a Auto Mechanic. Course the court appeal document does not state Roscoe was a Baptist Minister.
Hinkle Murder"Court Appeal" Whitaker v. Commonwealth
179 S.W.2d 448
Ky. 1944
Feb. 8, 1944. (Approx. 5 pages)Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County; J. S. Sandusky, Judge.
J. W. Whitaker was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MORRIS, Commissioner.
Appellant charged with the murder of Roscoe Hinkle was found guilty
and the penalty fixed at imprisonment for life. His motion for new
trial was supported by ten or more grounds; those urged on appeal
are: (1) The court committed prejudicial error in overruling motion
for continuance. (2) In admitting over objection the testimony of a
five year old boy, on grounds that he was not shown to have been
properly qualified as a witness. (3) Certain incompetent testimony
was prejudicial though withdrawn from the jury.
The homicide occurred about 11:30 a. m., April 20, 1943. At the time
Hinkle was working at the private garage of one Todd, located just
outside the limits of Somerset. He was a mechanic and had been in
Ohio looking for work, and upon return begun work for Todd a few days
prior to the homicide. Appellant operated a grocery store where
deceased had done some trading and owed Whitaker a store account,
about which some dispute had arisen.
The wife of deceased testified that Whitaker had come to their home
several times to collect a bill; she thought the amount owing to
Whitaker was a balance of $5 on an account of $13.88. About there
weeks before the homicide Whitaker had come to the home and asked for
payment on the **449 bill. Hinkle told him that he had been out of
work, and that he 'aimed to pay it as soon as he could.' Whitaker
said he wanted his money and was 'going to have it.' She said he had
come on another occasion under the influence of liquor, and said
'Roscoe (Hinkle) was a hypocrite and did not want to pay his bill;'
that he had a pistol and was very angry.
Following the homicide Hinkle was found lying in the garage flat on
his back, with three bullet holes on *281 the front of his body and
two in the back. No weapon of any kind was found near Hinkle, save a
file. His body was searched and disclosed a small knife in his
pocket; he had a paper carton in or under his arm.
Mrs. Hahn lived about 40 feet from the garage; she saw Whitaker go
into the garage, and heard Hinkle say, 'I have been to Cincinnati and
can't pay you,' and the shooting started; she heard two shots and
heard Hinkle cry, 'Help, Murder, O don't,' and heard three shots
follow. Whitaker came out and went toward his store. Other neighbors
heard the shooting and the cry of 'Help, Murder,' but heard nothing
said before the shots, which they described as had Mrs. Hahn.
Alice Merrick testified that 'about a year ago' Whitaker came to her
house and said 'No G. D. s. b. was going to owe him and get by with
it.' This was objected to and the court interposed and asked if
Whitaker had called Hinkle's name, and witness answered 'No.' The
court said to the jury, 'You will not consider the testimony of this
witness for any purpose.' Counsel for defense moved the court to
discharge the jury, and the motion was overruled with exception.
Jimmy Hahn, the five and one-half year old boy, was offered as a
witness. Counsel objected because of his immature age and he was
interrogated in chambers. On interrogations by the court he said he
was five years old and lived with his grandmother. He knew Whitaker
and Hinkle, and was in the garage watching Hinkle cleaning a file
when Whitaker came in and said he wanted Hinkle to pay him; Hinkle
replied he 'didn't have a penny in the world,' and then 'Bill Jack
shot him.' Hinkle threw down the file and ran to the 'little room.'
He said Whitaker shot Hinkle three times, and Hinkle hollored,
'Murder, Help, Don't.' On the stand the boy repeated what had been
brought out by the court without material change. He did say that
Roscoe, at the time, 'was not trying to hurt Jack.'
On cross-examination, and testing his competency, he was asked what
would happen to him if he told an untruth, and replied, 'Bill Jack
will shoot me.' He was asked about the 'old had man' and said he
lived under the ground and would get him if the didn't tell the
truth. Further examination was as follows:
'Who was been telling you what to state? A. Nobody.
*282 'Has your grandmother told you what to state? A. Yes.
'Did anybody else tell you what to state? A. Yes, this big crowd here.
'Before your grandmother told you did you know what you were going to
state? A. Yes, I have been in the courthouse before.
'How many times did your grandmother tell you what to state; a good
many times? Have you told what she told you to tell? A. Yes.'
On re-cross he was asked: 'Jimmy your grandmother told you to tell
the truth, didn't she? A. Yes. And that's all she told you to tell?
A. Yes.'
When he had finished counsel for defense asked that the boy's
testimony be withdrawn; the motion was overruled with exception.
Whitaker testified that he was sixty-six years old, and had some
heart ailment which interfered with his breathing. He had known
Hinkle for five or six years, and there had never been any hard
feelings between them 'as he knew of.' He had sued him and obtained
an attachment six months previous to the difficulty. He said he went
to the garage at about 11:30 to pick up some empty soft drink
bottles. Hinkle had been in Whitaker's store that morning and had
bought something. There was no trouble then. I was his habit to go
and pick up soft drink bottles which the garage men had bought and
taken to the garage. He said when he first went in he walked around a
truck and saw Hinkle. They spoke a few words to each other and Hinkle
said: "How much do you say I owe you yet?' and he replied, 'I don't
know till I look at my books.' Hinkle said, 'I just owe you $5.00'
and I said I think it is more than that, and he said 'you are a G. D.
liar, you have accused my wife of lying **450 and you are a G. D.
lying s. o. b." He said Hinkle had a file in his hand and stepped
around the truck, and drew back in a striking position and struck at
him. 'I jumped back and he raised it up and hit at me again, and then
I shot him,' with a pistol he took from his front trouser's pocket.
He fired two or three times, 'I don't know how many,' and Hinkle
checked up and said, 'I'll murder you, and started at me again and I
shot again; I shot him to keep him from killing me.' Appellant said
it was his habit to take a pistol *283 to his store and back to his
room at night. 'Sometimes I forget about having it and don't put it
up for a while.' He denied what Mrs. Hinkle had said on occasions of
visits to her home, and admitted that he had theretofore been
convicted of manslaughter.
A magistrate (relative) testified that Whitaker came to him on the
day of the homicide and asked him to take him to town to surrender
him go surety on his bond. Another witness told him that he came to
his home and tried without success to get the sheriff's office over
the phone. Both say he was sober. Other witnesses testified that they
had gone to the Hinkle home with Whitaker, and he was then sober, and
made no aggravating statements. The commonwealth introduced several
witnesses who testified that appellant's reputation for morals and
veracity was bad, with proper admonitions as to its purpose and
effect. In rebuttal defense introduced four witnesses who testified
that Whitaker's reputation for veracity was good; some of these were
successfully attacked by the commonwealth on the question of veracity.
Appellant insists that he was entitled to a continuance for two
reasons, first because of a physical disability, and second because
counsel had not sufficient time to properly prepare and present his
defense. It was shown that due to some heart ailment appellant was in
bad physical condition. One doctor thought it would be dangerous to
his health for him to go through the trial; several doctors agreeing
to the existence of his ailment, did not think it would be dangerous,
but it would be better for him to go through with the trial and get
the ordeal behind him.
Reading his testimony, which was given in an intelligent and
straightforward manner, we find no indication of discommoding
disability. It was asserted in supporting affidavits that the two
able counsel who represented accused were only employed on the day
before the trial. However, counter affidavits showed that one of
counsel had visited appellant in jail several times; appellant had
conversed with him over the phone on several occasions. This attorney
had been present at the examining trial on May 4th, and questioned
commonwealth's witnesses. There had also been held a coroner's
inquest, though it was not shown that counsel was present.
*284 [1] [2] As we read the numerous affidavits, the conclusion may
be reached that the delay in closing with counsel was due entirely to
the failure of appellant in satisfactorily securing payment of a fee.
The failure of appellant to bestir himself in preparation did not
warrant him in neglecting to look to the procurement of witnesses, if
any to be had. Appellant knew, or should have known at all times,
what proof he would be able to produce to counter the few witnesses
introducted for the commonwealth. Sebree v. Com., 260 Ky. 526, 86
S.W.2d 282. As we read the record, there was nothing complicated in
the whole case. Appellant admitted the homicide, and under our
repeated decisions it then became incumbent on him to satisfy the
jury that it was committed in his self-defense. A careful reading of
the affidavits does not justify us in concluding that the court
abused the discretion vested in him in passing on motion for
continuance.
[3] [4] We have quoted above the testimony of the witness who
testified as to statements made about one year prior to the homicide.
As noted, the court promptly withdrew consideration from the jury
with proper admonition. There are very few exceptions to the almost
universal rule that error in the court's admission of testimony on
the character here criticised is cured by proper admonition and its
withdrawal from the jury's consideration. center>Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky.
845, 61 S.W.2d 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514, 99 S.W.2d 715;
McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203, 272 S.W. 423. Some of these are
distinguished in Bailey v. Com., 294 Ky. 355, 171 S.W.2d 1005.
[5] We have also recited the testimony of the five year old boy, both
in his examination in chambers and on the stand. We have had no few
cases where this same question was raised, and have evolved the **451
rule as correctly quoted by counsel from the case of Mattingly v.
Com., 240 Ky. 625, 42 S.W.2d 874, 875, to this effect: 'The rule
respecting the subject is that a child offered as a witness having
sufficient natural intelligence, and having been so instructed as to
comprehend the nature of the act of telling the truth, and the
consequence of willful falsehood, must be admitted to testify.'
[6] In the case of Wright v. Com., 267 Ky. 441, 102 S.W.2d 376, we
were dealing with the testimony of a girl who was seven years old,
and we said that there *285 was nothing indicating that the child did
not possess sufficient intelligence to narrate truthfully the facts,
and we concluded as we do here that the court did not abuse
discretion in holding the witness to be competent. The court below is
in better position to determine this question than are we who have
only the transcript before us; he sees the witness, observes his
demeanor, and we would hesitate to hold error unless it appeared that
discretion had been abused. In the case of Jones v. Com., 267 Ky.
465, 102 S.W.2d 345, 347, wherein we reviewed several cases touching
the question, we held that a girl six years old was a competent
witness, since she 'unmistakably indicated that she knew what she was
testifying about and understandingly comprehended the facts' about
which inquiry is being made. In Leahman v. Broughton, 196 Ky. 146,
244 S.W. 403, referred to in Meade v. Com., 214 Ky. 88, 282 S.W. 781,
we held that regardless of the age if the infant is shown to possess
sufficient intelligence and sense of obligation to tell the truth,
although it is unable to comprehend the mysteries of the future life,
it is competent.
[7] [8] An examination of the testimony of the boy here showed him to
be of fair intelligence for one of his age; his testimony was not
materially disturbed by cross examination, and he manifested a double
reason for telling the truth. While this is the most serious question
presented, we are of the opinion that the court did not err in
treating the boy as a competent witness or in refusing to exclude his
evidence, his credibility, of course, being a question for the
consideration of the jury. A close survey of the whole record does
not impress us that there was committed on the whole case any
reversible error.
Judgment affirmed.
Ky. 1944
WHITAKER v. COMMONWEALTH
179 S.W.2d 448, 297 Ky. 279
END OF DOCUMENT



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